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HOW WILL MORSE V. FREDERICK BE APPLIED?
by
Erwin Chemerinsky*
In 2007, the Supreme Court decided Morse v. Frederick, a 5-4 decision in
which Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, decided that a student
could be punished for displaying a banner with the words “BONG HiTS 4
JESUS” on a public sidewalk. In this Essay, the author explores the
implications of this decision, focusing on the important question of how it
will be understood and applied by school officials, school boards, and lower
court judges. The author suggests that the opinion was misguided and—
from a First Amendment perspective—highly undesirable.
The author argues that the decision cannot be justified under existing First
Amendment principles, and cautions that it could be seen as authorizing
punishment of students for speech that is deemed distasteful or offensive,
even just juvenile. However, the concurring opinion by Justice Alito suggests
that the decision is exceedingly narrow and based on a very unusual factual
context. The author notes that if Justice Alito’s opinion is seen as defining
the scope of the holding, the case establishes only the power of schools to
punish speech encouraging illegal drug use rather than giving school
officials great discretion to punish student speech.
Despite the fact that Morse v. Frederick is consistent with decisions from
the Supreme Court and lower federal courts over the last two decades, the
author’s hope is that Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion will be read
through the prism of Justice Alito’s concurring opinion, thereby having little
effect on the already very limited First Amendment rights of students.
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INTRODUCTION

The most important question about Morse v. Frederick is how it will be
understood and applied by school officials, school boards, and lower
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1

court judges. Will this decision be seen as authorizing punishment of
students for speech that is deemed distasteful or offensive or even just
2
juvenile? Or will it be regarded as a narrow decision about a very
unusual factual context? Justice Alito’s concurring opinion offers hope
that it will have little effect. He wrote separately, joined by Justice
Kennedy, to suggest that it is an exceedingly narrow decision. Justice
Alito wrote:
I join the opinion of the Court on the understanding that (a) it
goes no further than to hold that a public school may restrict
speech that a reasonable observer would interpret as advocating
illegal drug use and (b) it provides no support for any restriction of
speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any
political or social issue, including speech on issues such as ‘the
wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing marijuana for
3
medicinal use.’
My hope is that lower courts will read Chief Justice Roberts’s
majority opinion through the prism of Justice Alito’s concurring opinion.
After all, it was a 5-4 decision and Justices Alito and Kennedy were
obviously integral to that result. Yet, I worry that there will be the
tremendous temptation to read the opinion broadly as giving school
officials great discretion to punish student speech. I want to suggest in
this Essay that the opinion was misguided because the only way that it
makes doctrinal sense is if it is read as being about deference to school
officials, but from a First Amendment perspective this is highly
undesirable.
Thus, Part II of this Essay argues that the decision cannot be justified
under existing First Amendment principles, other than the need for
deference to school officials. In Part III, I argue why this is undesirable
and thus why school officials and lower courts should adopt Justice
Alito’s interpretation of the opinion.
II. WHAT WAS WRONG WITH CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS’S
APPROACH?

In many ways, the Court’s majority opinion was at odds with longstanding First Amendment precepts. First, the Court upheld a viewpointbased restriction in a public forum. I cannot think of any other case that
ever has done this. Public sidewalks long have been regarded as the
quintessential public forum. In Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization, the Court struck down an ordinance that prohibited
all public meetings in the streets and other public places without a
1

Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
A number of years ago, a school administrator complained to me that my
child’s columns for the school newspaper were “juvenile.” I could not resist
remarking that as a sixteen-year-old that was to be expected since he was a juvenile.
3
Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring).
2
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4

permit from the city. In a famous plurality opinion, Justice Owen
Roberts found that there was a right to use government property for
speech purposes. Roberts wrote:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time
out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and
5
liberties of citizens.
If any principle of the First Amendment is clearly established it is
that viewpoint restrictions are not allowed in public forums unless the
government meets strict scrutiny. Viewpoint restrictions of speech are
virtually never allowed. The government obviously should not be able to
advance a particular position by silencing those holding an opposite view.
There can be no dispute that Frederick would not have been
punished if his speech had condemned use of drugs. Thus, the sanctions
for his speech were based entirely on the viewpoint he choose to express
in a public forum. Chief Justice Roberts argued that it was an official
school activity, but this fails to acknowledge that the speech occurred not
in a classroom or even an auditorium, but on a public sidewalk. If
Frederick had not been a student, but a person who used the occasion to
hold up such a banner, surely the government could not have punished
the individual, even though the government would have had an interest
in keeping students from receiving messages that they perceived as
encouraging illegal drug use. By contrast, the government could have
stopped the person from coming into school with such a banner. The
point is that even though it was during the school day, it was still a public
sidewalk, and it was still the Court upholding viewpoint discrimination.
Second, there was no evidence of any disruption of school activities.
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the Court said
that the First Amendment protected the ability of students in a high
6
school to wear black armbands to protest the Vietnam War. The Court
emphasized that the armbands were a silent protest that did not disrupt
7
education within the schools. The Court said that “[t]here is no indication
8
that the work of the schools or any class was disrupted.” Justice Fortas wrote that
the speech was protected absent a showing that it would “materially

4

Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
Id. at 515 (Roberts, J., concurring).
6
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
7
The Court also stressed that other symbols worn by students were allowed in
the school and that it was impermissible for the government to discriminate among
them based on their message. Id. at 508, 510.
8
Id. at 508.
5
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and substantially interfere[] with the requirements of appropriate discipline
9
in the operation of the school.”
Admittedly, subsequent Supreme Court cases failed to follow Tinker’s
holding that student speech could be punished only if it was actually
disruptive of school activities. In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the
Court upheld the punishment of a student for a speech given at a school
assembly, nominating another student for a position in student
10
government, that was filled with sexual innuendo. The student was
suspended for a few days and kept from speaking at his graduation as
scheduled.
The Court upheld the punishment and emphasized the need for
judicial deference to educational institutions. Chief Justice Burger, writing
for the Court, said that “[t]he determination of what manner of speech
in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with
11
the school board.” The Court also distinguished Tinker on the ground
that it had involved political speech, whereas the expression in Bethel was
sexual in nature. Chief Justice Burger said that “it is a highly appropriate
function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and
12
offensive terms in public discourse.” He concluded that “[a] high school
assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit monologue” and “it
was perfectly appropriate for the school to disassociate itself to make
the point to the pupils that vulgar speech . . . is wholly inconsistent
13
with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school education.”
In Bethel, the Court at least argued that Fraser’s speech disrupted
school activities, but in Morse v. Frederick, the Court made no effort to do
so. Although the Court did not overrule Tinker, it clearly abandoned the
idea that speech can be punished only if it is actually disruptive of school
activities.
Third, the Court allowed punishment of speech that advocated
illegal activity without any showing that it would have the slightest effect.
The key case, defining when the government may punish advocacy of
14
illegality is Brandenburg v. Ohio. A leader of a Ku Klux Klan group was
convicted under the Ohio criminal syndicalism law. Evidence of his
incitement was a film of the events at a Klan rally, which included racist
and anti-Semitic speech, and several items that appeared in the film,
including a number of firearms. In a per curium opinion, the Court
said that:
These later decisions have fashioned the principle that the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not

9
10
11
12
13
14

Id. at 505 (citation omitted).
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
Id. at 683.
Id.
Id. at 685–86.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
15
produce such action.

Chief Justice Roberts did not assert that Frederick’s banner would
have the slightest effect in encouraging drug use. He could not do so. It
is questionable whether students understood the banner as encouraging
drug use, and even if they did it is doubtful any would be more likely to
use drugs because of it. Justice Stevens expressed this well:
This is a nonsense message, not advocacy. The Court’s feeble effort
to divine its hidden meaning is strong evidence of that. . . .
Admittedly, some high school students (including those who use
drugs) are dumb. Most students, however, do not shed their brains
at the schoolhouse gate, and most students know dumb advocacy
when they see it. The notion that the message on this banner would
actually persuade either the average student or even the dumbest
16
one to change his or her behavior is most implausible.
My concern is thus that Morse v. Frederick is a significant departure
from well established First Amendment principles, even those that
concern when student speech can be punished. The only way of
understanding the case is being about the need for deference to school
authorities. Indeed, the majority concludes its opinion by expressing the
need for deference to the principal. Chief Justice Roberts states:
School principals have a difficult job, and a vitally important one.
When Frederick suddenly and unexpectedly unfurled his banner,
Morse had to decide to act—or not act—on the spot. It was
reasonable for her to conclude that the banner promoted illegal
drug use—in violation of established school policy—and that failing
to act would send a powerful message to the students in her charge,
including Frederick, about how serious the school was about the
17
dangers of illegal drug use.
Justice Alito, in his concurring opinion, wants to see the case as
18
being just about the interest of schools in stopping illegal drug use. But
that begs the question of why expression about illegal drug use would be
regarded as different from all other speech. Surely other activities—such
as violence in schools—are worse. If a school can stop a student from
holding up an ambiguous banner, like “Bong Hits 4 Jesus,” it would be
able to punish a banner encouraging violence. There are countless
examples of behavior that is illegal and harmful that might be expressed
by students. Imagine a t-shirt or a banner encouraging promiscuous
sexual activity illegal under statutory rape laws and potentially devastating

15
16
17
18

Id. at 447.
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2649 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2629.
Id. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring).
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to health. Or even what about a t-shirt or banner that encouraged
students to skip school? The point is that if schools can punish “Bong
Hits 4 Jesus,” it is hard to see why they could not sanction that speech as
well. My fear is therefore that principals, school boards, and lower courts
will read Morse v. Frederick as giving them more authority to punish
student speech.
Already there is indication that exactly this is occurring. For
example, soon after Morse, in Wisniewski v. Board of Education of Weedsport
Central School District, the Second Circuit upheld “an eighth-grade
student’s suspension for sharing with friends via the Internet a small
drawing crudely, but clearly, suggesting that a named teacher should be
19
shot and killed.” The speech occurred entirely outside school. It was
shared among friends via Instant Messaging. It was hyperbole, not a
threat. As the Second Circuit noted:
At the same time, a police investigator who interviewed Aaron
concluded that the icon was meant as a joke, that Aaron fully
understood the severity of what he had done, and that Aaron posed
no real threat to VanderMolen or to any other school official. A
pending criminal case was then closed. Aaron was also evaluated by
a psychologist, who also found that Aaron had no violent intent,
20
posed no actual threat, and made the icon as a joke.
Still, the Court of Appeals, citing to Morse, upheld the student’s
punishment. This, of course, goes even further than Morse because it says
that even speech that occurs entirely outside school can be punished.
III. WHY MORSE V. FREDERICK WAS WRONG

Why care whether school administrators can punish students for a
silly banner like “Bong Hits 4 Jesus”? Justice Thomas, in his concurring
opinion, argues that students should have no free speech rights at all and
21
that Tinker should be expressly overruled.
In Tinker, the Court said that “First Amendment rights, applied in
light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available
to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
22
expression at the schoolhouse gate.” The Court said that “[i]n our
system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism.
School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students . . . .
[Students] are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect
23
. . . .”

19
20
21
22
23

Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2007).
Id. at 36.
Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
Id. at 511.
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The problem with Justice Thomas’s argument that students should
have no speech rights is that it undervalues the importance of student
speech and overvalues the interests of the government in suppressing
student speech. On the one hand, students, like all others in society, have
an autonomy interest in expressing themselves. In general, freedom of
speech is safeguarded as a fundamental right that is an essential aspect of
personhood and autonomy. Professor Baker said:
To engage voluntarily in a speech act is to engage in self-definition
or expression. A Vietnam war protestor may explain that when she
chants “Stop This War Now” at a demonstration, she does so
without any expectation that her speech will affect the
continuance of war . . . ; rather, she participates and chants in
order to define herself publicly in opposition to the war. This war
protestor provides a dramatic illustration of the importance of this
self-expressive use of speech, independent of any effective
24
communication to others, for self-fulfillment or self-realization.
Protecting speech because it aids the political process or furthers
the search for truth emphasizes the instrumental values of expression.
Protecting speech because it is a crucial aspect of autonomy sees
25
expression as intrinsically important. Justice Thurgood Marshall
observed that “[t]he First Amendment serves not only the needs of the
polity but also those of the human spirit—a spirit that demands self26
expression.”
Students, too, have an autonomy interest in expressing themselves.
The message may be political or entertainment or even just silly, but that
is true of all speech that is protected in society. The Court in Morse v.
Frederick stresses that Frederick’s banner was not political speech. Chief
Justice Roberts states: “But not even Frederick argues that the banner
conveys any sort of political or religious message. Contrary to the
dissent’s suggestion, . . . this is plainly not a case about political debate
27
over the criminalization of drug use or possession.” But the First
Amendment has never been limited to protecting just political
expression.
Tinker powerfully expressed the importance of protecting student
speech. After his famous declaration that students do not “shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate,” Justice Fortas states: “This has been the unmistakable
28
holding of this Court for almost 50 years.” After a long string of

24

C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. Rev.
964, 994 (1978).
25
See, e.g., Martin Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593
(1982) (arguing that self-realization should be regarded as the exclusive value of the
First Amendment).
26
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring).
27
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2625 (2007).
28
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
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citations to many prior Supreme Court rulings, Justice Fortas quotes
Justice Robert Jackson’s eloquent opinion from West Virginia State Board of
29
Education v. Barnette:
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects
the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures—Boards of
Education not excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate,
and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not
perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are
educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous
protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are
not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to
discount important principles of our government as mere
30
platitudes.
Later in his majority opinion, Justice Fortas returns to this theme
and powerfully proclaims the free speech rights of students. Fortas
declares:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority
over their students. Students in school as well as out of school are
“persons” under our Constitution. They are possessed of
fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they
themselves must respect their obligations to the State. In our
system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of
only that which the State chooses to communicate. They may not
be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially
approved. In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally
valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to
31
freedom of expression of their views.
Indeed, like Justice Jackson in Barnette, Justice Fortas stressed
freedom of speech is especially important in schools. He quoted an
earlier opinion from Justice Brennan declaring: “The vigilant protection
of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community
of American schools. The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of
32
ideas.’”
At the same time, the Court underestimates the danger of
government power in the schools context. The First Amendment is
based on the reality that there is a strong impulse to silence and
punish speech that is distasteful. As has often been expressed, the First
Amendment is not needed for the messages we like; they would be
allowed to occur anyway. Freedom of speech is about safeguarding the
controversial or unpopular message. Chief Justice Roberts’s majority

29

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that a
state law requiring students to salute the flag is unconstitutional).
30
Id. at 637.
31
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
32
Id. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
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opinion in Morse v. Frederick never acknowledges the reality that
principals may often choose to punish speech they don’t like,
especially from students they don’t like.
For students, there is no protection from arbitrary punishment for
speech except through the First Amendment and the courts. Yet, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Morse v. Frederick risks that there will be
much less judicial protection for student speech.
The solution, then, is for lower courts—and hopefully principals
and school boards—to read Morse v. Frederick narrowly. It was a 5-4
decision and two of the Justices in the majority—Alito and Kennedy—
emphasized that the holding is just about the ability of schools to
punish student speech encouraging drug use. The opinion should be
read no more broadly than that.
IV. CONCLUSION

The reality is that Morse v. Frederick is consistent with the decisions
from the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts over the last two
decades. Over the three decades of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts,
there have been virtually no decisions protecting rights of students in
schools. Indeed, there have been remarkably few rulings concerning
students’ speech, despite hundreds of lower court decisions on the
topic. There have been only two Supreme Court cases concerning
student speech in elementary, middle, and high schools, excluding
cases concerning religious expression: Bethel School District No. 403 v.
33
34
Fraser and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. In both, the Court
rejected the students’ First Amendment claims and sided with the
schools.
In fact, in the almost forty years since Tinker, schools have won
virtually every constitutional claim involving students’ rights. For
35
instance, in Ingraham v. Wright, the Court rejected that students have
a right to procedural due process before the imposition of corporal
36
punishment. In New Jersey v. T.L.O. and Vernonia School District 47J v.
37
Acton, the Court rejected Fourth Amendment claims by students and
upheld the ability of schools to search students without probable cause
and to subject them to random drug testing. In Board of Education v.
38
Earls, the Court allowed a school system to require random drug
testing of all students participating in extracurricular activities.
In light of the later cases, it is hardly surprising that at least one
federal court of appeals has concluded that subsequent Supreme
33
34
35
36
37
38

478 U.S. 675 (1986).
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
430 U.S. 651 (1977).
469 U.S. 325 (1985).
515 U.S. 646 (1995).
536 U.S. 822 (2002).
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Court cases cast doubt on whether Tinker remains viable and whether
39
students retain free speech rights. There simply are hardly any
Supreme Court cases in the past thirty years protecting students’
constitutional rights.
Morse v. Frederick continues that pattern. But if lower courts focus
on the concurring opinion of Justice Alito there is more hope.
Reading his opinion as defining the scope of the holding leads to the
conclusion that the case establishes only the power of schools to
punish speech encouraging illegal drug use. It is not a victory for the
First Amendment, but it is far better than Chief Justice Roberts’s
majority opinion.

39

Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 737 (7th Cir. 1994).

